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How might we make sense of the findings of epidemiological research showing the 
effects of social inequalities without accepting the validity of problematic diagnostic 
categories used by psychiatric epidemiologists (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2003)?  How might 
we make sense of processes happening at a community and systemic level without 
neglecting individual experience?  How should we conceptualise experiences which are 
embodied (i.e. felt and transmitted through our biological systems) without falling prey 
to dualistic or biologically reductionist thinking?  
  
In this article, we hope to examine the links between social inequality and paranoia 
without falling into such traps.  We use the term 'paranoia' broadly.  Although single 
symptom research into psychosis has made great strides (e.g. Bentall, 2004) we feel there 
is benefit to be gained from taking the experience of paranoia as a starting point rather 
than beginning with an unnecessarily narrow operational definition of, for example, the 
diagnostic criteria for persecutory delusions.  Paranoia, of course, is well-represented in 
psychiatric diagnostic categories (e.g. paranoid schizophrenia, delusional and personality 
disorders) and is in some measure a feature of many people’s everyday lives.  However, 
focusing on such categories assumes that the differences between them are both valid and 
more important than the commonalities in the experiences they represent. Accordingly, 
we begin by presenting a brief critique of psychiatric thinking about paranoia, followed 
by a re-theorization that focuses on the social and material constitution of experience 
through feelings.  We end by outlining some implications for intervention.  
  
Psychiatry and Paranoia  
Traditionally, psychiatric theorising assumes that experiences of paranoia are simply 
irrational and false, a sign of pathology whose context and content are meaningless 
(Harper, 1996, 2004).  However, there are grounds for rejecting each of these 
assumptions.  
  
Even though many “normal” everyday beliefs lack supporting evidence, psychiatry 
typically adopts a naively realist stance towards paranoia, and diagnosis rarely involves 
empirical investigation. Maher has argued that the assessment of the plausibility of 
beliefs is 'typically made by a clinician on the basis of "common sense," and not on the 
basis of a systematic evaluation of empirical data' (1992, p.261) and there appears to be 
some empirical evidence of this (McCabe et al., 2002).  
  
The view that paranoid beliefs are simply pathological and irrational ignores evidence 
that people vary in the strength of conviction with which they express them (Garety, 
1985), that irrational beliefs are highly prevalent in our culture – for example, with 
respect to the supernatural, and that "everyday” suspicion and mistrust are also more 
prevalent than might be expected (Social Surveys/Gallup Poll Ltd, 1995). Delusional 
beliefs, too, are more common than psychiatry presupposes (e.g. van Os, 2000; Poulton 
et al., 2000).  The dimensions which seem to differentiate between those who do not 
come into contact with mental health services and those who do are not their beliefs per 
se but the levels of distress, conviction and preoccupation associated with them (Peters et 
al., 1999). Moreover, although mainstream psychiatry traditionally treats the content of 
paranoid [p.18]beliefs as meaningless, they often relate to purpose and meaning in a 
person’s life and can be associated with life experience (Rhodes & Jakes, 2000) or wider 
societal influences (Mirowsky & Ross, 1983).  
  
In sum, psychiatric theorizing reductively individualises and medicalises a complex 
phenomenon, obscuring its links with social conditions. To redress this problem we now 
offer an alternative understanding of paranoia, focusing on how social and material 
conditions produce feelings which, we suggest, are the primary cause of paranoia.  
  
Re-theorising paranoia  
Perhaps the most prominent component of human consciousness is language, the “inner 
voice” that provides a running commentary on our actions. But consciousness also has a 
non-verbal component which, to use Vygotsky’s memorable terminology, our inner voice 
“completes”. This non-verbal component consists of feelings. Feelings include emotions 
of all kinds, motivational states such as hunger or thirst, and the more subtle feelings 
associated with inarticulate refusals or half-formed desires. Although feelings are 
fundamental to human consciousness, in our culture their contribution to action is 
frequently downplayed. When we reflect upon the reasons why we act as we do, we tend 
to attribute our decisions mainly to rational-discursive factors. Whilst such factors indeed 
contribute, the ever-present role of feelings as the ground upon which they are weighed 
and assessed is often ignored or under-emphasised. The alternative view (supported by 
most psychodynamic psychologies, cognitive psychologists like Zajonc and 
neuroscientists such as Panksepp and Damasio) is that feelings have a kind of nuanced 
primacy in human consciousness and are the primary determinants of motivation and 
choice.  
  
Moreover, these feelings are not just biological drives or innate instincts - they are also 
socialised. There are many resources we can draw upon to understand this; limitations of 
space mean just two will be briefly addressed here. First, there is extensive evidence that 
emotions, the archetypal class of feelings, are thoroughly socialised. Whilst Ekman and 
others hold that there are biologically hardwired basic emotions, it has nevertheless 
proved difficult to determine precisely how many such emotions there are. Furthermore, 
even Ekman agrees that all emotions appear within local moral orders that determine the 
circumstances within which it is appropriate to experience them. Additionally, the 
“display rules” that regulate how emotion can permissibly be expressed show extensive 
cross-cultural variability. Further evidence for the socialisation of emotion is provided by 
evidence that some cultures have emotions that others do not.  
  
Second, Damasio’s (1994) neuroscientific work suggests that memories for events are 
not only auditory or visual: they also include memories of feelings, the body-state 
profiles that accompanied them. On future occasions when those events might be 
relevant, their accompanying feelings can be subtly reactivated and influence decision-
making. When positive feelings previously associated with an option are reactivated, they 
serve both to focus our attention upon it and make it appear more desirable. Negative 
feelings do the opposite, encouraging neglect and unfavourable evaluation. Damasio calls 
these reconstituted feelings “somatic markers”, and his work with brain-injured people 
suggests they play a critical role in decision-making in social settings.  
  
Socialized feelings, then, provide the primary, pre-cognitive ground upon which we 
humans engage with the world, from which we assess it and make decisions. They are the 
evaluative terrain upon which cognitions and perceptions are already played out, the pre-
reflective structure of meanings from within which thoughts and perceptions are always 
already textured (Merleau-Ponty, 1962/2002). It is not simply that feelings provide 
information about our evaluation of a situation, although they may. More importantly, 
before any conscious information processing occurs, feelings shape our reactions in two 
ways. First, because they focus our attention on some aspects of a situation rather than 
others they shape our perceptions. Second, because they shape our evaluations of what 
[p.19]we perceive, they inform our interpretations and choices.  
  
Simply put, our argument is that paranoia is principally the outcome of such feelingful 
processes. It is therefore likely to afflict people whose safety, self-worth or competency 
has continually been challenged, and who have received little respite or compensatory 
loving reassurance from others. Such people may acquire, in response to their 
experiences, an enduring, inchoate, habitually fearful way of being in the world, and a 
corresponding mode of perceiving and thinking. Feelings do not happen to the same 
rapid timescale as rational-discursive processes, and are not as neatly encapsulated as 
meanings in language. Moreover, the decisions and perceptions they regulate arise in 
human worlds where others will react to and interpret them. Feelings can therefore 
initiate and maintain trajectories of social interaction that have the unfortunate effect of 
stigmatising or isolating the person, further intensifying their fears and anxieties and 
“proving” their initial validity. Over successive interactions, fear and anxiety may thus 
come to structure people’s perceptions and interpretations so thoroughly that they can 
barely be recognised as such. It can then seem mostly obvious that the threats, slights, 
insults and exclusions people perceive are simple, incontrovertible features of how the 
world actually is.  
  
On a case-by-case basis such outcomes may be represented as attributional errors or 
individual cognitive processing biases. However, in our view this cognitive approach 
wrongly individualises experience, unjustly translating the acquired effects of adverse 
socialisation into information processing flaws. In contrast, we highlight the social and 
material conditions of social inequality, which can encourage relatively paranoid ways of 
being in the world.  
  
For example, there is evidence that disadvantaged areas typically have increased risks of 
assault, burglary and theft, greater prevalence of graffiti, vandalism, derelict buildings 
and street gangs, and are characterised by powerlessness and low levels of trust (Ross et 
al 2001). People there are more likely to be unemployed or homeless, to have 
experienced social isolation, and to have fewer opportunities, more restrictive choices 
and fewer resources. There are synergistic associations between these social and material 
conditions and adverse socialisation (see Nightingale & Cromby, 2002), and 
ethnographic studies clearly demonstrate their painful impact upon individuals 
(Charlesworth, 1999). Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, there is evidence that paranoia is 
associated with immigration and low socio-economic status (Kendler 1982), refugee 
status (Westermeyer 1980), experience of victimisation and stressful life events (Johns et 
al 2004). People with a diagnosis of schizophrenia often have paranoid experiences, and 
research shows that people with fathers occupying low socio-economic status and who 
were born in a deprived area are 8.1 times more likely than others to receive such a 
diagnosis (Harrison, Gunnell, Glazebrook, Page, & Kwiecinski, 2001); that Black and 
Asian people in the UK are 50% more likely to be diagnosed with schizophrenia than 
white people (King, Coker, Leavey, Hoare, & Johnson-Sabine, 1994); and the prevalence 
of schizophrenia diagnoses is higher among Black people living in majority white areas  
(Boydell et al 2000).   
  
It is perhaps no surprise that if you have been excluded, marginalised, discriminated 
against or have faced victimisation you may start to experience the world as a fearful 
place, although our ways of being in the world are also shaped by wider cultural forces 
and more local experiences like family relationships. For example, the possibility that 
paranoia is more common in men (Johns et al., 2004) and young people (Ellett, Lopes & 
Chadwick, 2003) merits investigation.  However, space does not permit further 
exploration here.   
  
Implications for Intervention  
How might an approach like this inform interventions?  At an individual and family level 
we need to acknowledge the socially constructed nature of judgements about beliefs and 
not necessarily focus on their ‘truth’ or otherwise.  Instead we should pay attention to the 
content of a person's para-[p.20]noid belief and be sensitive to its context in the light of 
their personal history.  We should aim at enabling people to get a better 'fit' between their 
beliefs and the lives they wish to lead.  Research on those who hear voices highlights the 
benefits for people of developing explanations which allow them to make sense of their 
experiences (and do not unduly distress them); which provide contact with a community 
which shares these meanings (e.g. spiritualist churches, hearing voices group etc); which 
involve certain helpful practices (e.g. meditation, political action etc.), and which allow 
them to continue living their lives in a relatively undisrupted manner (Romme & Escher, 
2000). From our perspective, it is highly relevant that feelings of safety, security, warmth 
and even love, are likely to be integral to such groups and practices.  
  
However, work at an individual and family level is not enough. We should support 
initiatives to combat the social isolation produced by the fragmentation of community 
life and the excessive individualism of Western culture. One approach is to help set up 
support groups for people experiencing paranoia, similar to those fostered by the Hearing 
Voices Network (James, 2003; Knight, 2004). There is also a need to build trust within 
neighbourhoods in order to combat victimization, and to support broader initiatives 
aimed at addressing social inequalities and fighting victimisation and racism (activities 
engendering feelings of solidarity and belonging and a sense of identity which may 
themselves be therapeutic).  Finally, these approaches are unsustainable without national 
policies which consistently challenge discrimination and injustice. In a sense, we could 
view the received psychiatric view of paranoia as a form of 'false consciousness' which 
obscures the real causes of distress, locating it in faulty brain mechanisms, rather than out 
there in a sometimes hostile world.  In contrast, we could draw on ideas from liberation 
social psychology (Burton, 2004) to facilitate a process Ignacio Martin-Baro called 
conscientización by which people can educate and liberate themselves from oppressive 
social conditions.  
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